03948nam a22005298i 4500 000388834 UkCbUP 20220107135832.0 20170721114921.0 m|||||o||d|||||||| cr|||||||||||| 101021s2003||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d NEZPRACOVANÝ IMPORT 9780511813771 (ebook) 9780521815468 (hardback) 9780521894753 (paperback) UkCbUP eng rda UkCbUP JF1001 .M78 2003 320 21 Mueller, Dennis C., author. Public choice III / Dennis C. Mueller. 3rd ed. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003. 1 online resource (xix, 768 pages) : digital, PDF file(s). text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 18 Jul 2016). Introduction -- Part I: Origins of the state -- The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency -- The reason for collective choice - redistribution -- Part II: Public choice in a direct democracy -- The choice of voting rule -- Majority rule - positive properties -- Majority rule - normative properties -- Simple alternatives to majority rule -- Complicated alternatives to majority rule -- Exit, voice, and disloyalty -- Part III: Public choice in a representative democracy -- Federalism -- Two-party competition - deterministic voting -- Two-party competition - probabilistic voting -- Multiparty systems -- The paradox of voting -- Rent seeking -- Bureaucracy -- Legislatures and bureaucracies -- Dictatorship -- Part IV: Applications and testing -- Political competition and macroeconomic performance -- Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying -- The size of government -- Government size and economic performance -- Part V: Normative public choice -- Social welfare functions -- The impossibility of social ordering -- A just social contract -- Constitution as a utilitarian contract -- Liberal rights and social choices -- Part VI: What have we learned? -- Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics? -- Allocation, redistribution, and public choice. This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock. elektronické knihy fd186907 czenas electronic books eczenas Elections. Democracy. Social choice. Welfare economics. State, The. Print version: 9780521815468 https://knihovna.vse.cz/zdroje/cambridge-core-books-and-textbooks/?info Informace o práci s e-knihami https://zdroje.vse.cz/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813771 Plný text CAMBRIDGE-EBA EB PAR 000049601 UEP01 776 E-book Tištěná verze NEPOSILAT EB